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Abstract. New computing paradigms, modern feature-rich program-
ming languages and off-the-shelf software libraries enabled the develop-
ment of new sophisticated malware families. Evidence of this phenom-
ena is the recent growth of fileless malware attacks. Fileless malware or
memory resident malware is an example of an Advanced Volatile Threat
(AVT). In a fileless malware attack, the malware writes itself directly
onto the main memory (RAM) of the compromised device without leav-
ing any trace on the compromised device’s file system. For this reason,
fileless malware presents a difficult challenge for traditional malware de-
tection tools and in particular signature-based detection. Moreover, file-
less malware forensics and reverse engineering are nearly impossible using
traditional methods. The majority of fileless malware attacks in the wild
take advantage of MS PowerShell, however, fileless malware are not lim-
ited to MS PowerShell. In this paper, we designed and implemented a
fileless malware by taking advantage of new features in Javascript and
HTML5. The proposed fileless malware could infect any device that sup-
ports Javascript and HTML5. It serves as a proof-of-concept (PoC) to
demonstrate the threats of fileless malware in web applications. We used
the proposed fileless malware to evaluate existing methods and tech-
niques for malware detection in web applications. We tested the proposed
fileless malware with several free and commercial malware detection tools
that apply both static and dynamic analysis. The proposed fileless mal-
ware bypassed all the anti-malware detection tools included in our study.
In our analysis, we discussed the limitations of existing approaches/tools
and suggested possible detection and mitigation techniques.
Keywords: Fileless Malware, Unconventional Malware, Web vulnera-
bilities, Javascript, HTML5, Polymorphic Malware
1 Introduction
Fileless malware is a new class of the memory-resident malware family that
successfully infects and compromises a target system without leaving a trace on
the target filesystem or second memory (e.g., hard drive). Fileless malware infects
the target’s main-memory (RAM) and executes its malicious payload. Fileless
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malware is not just another memory-resident malware. To our knowledge, Fred
Cohen developed the first memory-resident malware (Lehigh Virus) in the early
80s. This usually leads some researchers to believe that fileless malware is not a
new malware threat but only a new name for an old threat. However, this is not
true, fileless malware has some distinguishing properties. First, malware attacks
require some file infection or writing to the hard drive, this includes traditional
memory resident malware. Fileless malware infection and propagation does not
require writing any data to the target device filesystem. However, it is possible
that the malicious payload (e.g., the end goal ) of the fileless malware writes data
to the hard drive, for example, a fileless ransomware, but again the ransomware
propagation and infection are fileless. The second key property of fileless malware
is that it depends heavily on using benign software utilities and libraries already
installed on the target device to execute the malicious payload. For instance,
a fileless ransomware will use cryptographic library and APIs already installed
on the target to complete its attack rather than installing a new cryptographic
libraries or implement its own.
There are other unique properties of fileless malware, but the most impor-
tant ones are the fileless infection approach and the use of benign utilities and
libraries of the compromised machine to execute the malicious payload. Those
two properties of fileless malware make it an effective threat in evading and
bypassing sophisticated anti-malware detection systems. This is because most
anti-malware relies on scanning the compromised filesystem to detect malware
infections. Also, because fileless malware use legitimate software utilities and
programs to attack computer systems, it is challenging for anti-malware systems
that use dynamic analysis to detect fileless malware. Moreover, being fileless is
an anti-forensics technique, since it does not leave any trace after the attack is
complete, it is tough for forensics investigator to reverse engineer the malware.
Fileless malware attacks and incidents are already observed in the wild com-
promising large enterprises. According to KASPERSKY lab, 140 enterprises were
attacked in 2017 using fileless malwares [9]. Ponemon Institute reported that
77% of the attacks against companies use fileless techniques [4]. Also, CYREN
recently reported that during 2017 there was over 300% increase in the use of
fileless attacks. Moreover, they expected that the new generation of Ransomware
would be fileless [11]. This expectation proved to be correct when TrendMicro
reported the analysis of SOREBRECT Ransomware, the first fileless ransomware
attack in the wild [25]. However, we think that it is inaccurate to describe SORE-
BRECT Ransomware as fileless malware, since it places an executable file on the
compromised machine which injects the malicious payload into a running sys-
tem process. Then, it deletes the file and any trace on the system logs using a
self-destruct routine. Because the infection and the injection of SOREBRECT
Ransomware requires placing files on the compromised host, we do not think it
is a true fileless malware. Moreover, deleting the files is not enough to hide the
trace, file carving techniques could be used to recover the deleted files.
Another common trend in developing fileless malware is the use of Microsoft
PowerShell. PowerShell is a command-line shell and scripting language that al-
lows system administrators to manage and automate tasks related to running
process, the operating system, and networks. It is preinstalled by default on new
Windows versions and it can be installed on Linux and MacOS systems. Pow-
erShell is a good example of a benign and powerful system utility that could be
used by fileless malware. Several reports by anti-malware vendors discussed how
malware authors take advantages of PowerShell to develop sophisticated fileless
malware [15].
In this paper, we summarize our research on fileless malware attacks in mod-
ern web applications. We investigate the possibility of developing a fileless mal-
ware using modern Javascript features that were introduced with HTML5. In
our assessment of the potential threats of fileless malware attacks, we explore the
use of benign Javascript and HTML5 features to develop fileless malware. Based
on our analysis we implemented JSLess as a proof-of-concept fileless Javascript
malware that successfully infects a web browser and executes several malicious
payloads.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, identify the malicious po-
tential of new benign features in web technology and how they could be used to
develop fileless malware. Second, design and implement JSLess as a PoC fileless
JS malware that uses a new dynamic injection method and advanced evasion
techniques to infect modern web apps and execute a variety of attacks. Third,
demonstrate the threats of fileless malware in modern web applications by eval-
uating the proposed fileless malware with several free and commercial malware
detection tools that apply both static and dynamic analysis.
This paper is organized as follows; section 2 is a literature review of fileless
malware and Javascript malware. In section 3, we explain the new benign features
in modern Javascript and HTML5 and there security issues. Then, in section 4
we present our Javascript fileless malware design and implementation. Next, in
section 5 we evaluate the evasion behaviors of the JS fileless malware against
free and commercial anti-malware tools, then we discuss possible detection and
mitigation techniques. Finally, the conclusion and possible future work presented
in section 6.
2 Related Work
Code injection attacks have been studied from different perspectives in the liter-
ature. The research in this area tried to detect malicious behaviors in Javascripts
using various methods, including signature-based analysis, utilizing machine
learning algorithms, using honeynets, and applying several de-obfuscation tech-
niques [13]. This section discusses the main research directions in this area and
highlights some of the most important contributions in the literature.
S. Yoon et al. proposed a method to generate unique signatures for malicious
Javascripts [29]. The authors used content-based signature generation techniques
and utilized the Term Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) and
Balanced Iterative Reducing and Clustering using Hierarchies methods to gen-
erate the conjunction signatures for Javascripts [29]. Although signature-based
analysis can help detect several malicious behaviours, the work in [29] is based
on the assumption that the attack type of the input Javascripts is known, which
is not always a practical assumption in real-life environments. Moreover, obfus-
cation remains a challenging problem that reduces the effectiveness of signature-
based techniques.
G. Blanc et al. tried to address the obfuscation problem by applying ab-
stract syntax tree (AST) based methods to characterize obfuscating transforma-
tions found in malicious JavaScript [5]. The authors used AST-based methods
to demonstrate significant regularities in obfuscated JavaScript programs. The
work in [5] is based on generating AST fingerprints (ASTFs) for each JS file
present in their learning dataset then manually picking representative subtrees
for further processing. The manual intervention in this procedure and relying
only on the training datasets without providing a mechanism to update the
training set with new samples raise many questions about the feasibility of this
solution. Moreover, the work in [5] did not consider the different categories of
obfuscation techniques in real-world malicious JavaScript, which was analyzed
by W. Xu et al. in [28]. Similar work was done by I. AL-Taharwa1 et al. to detect
obfuscation in JavaScript using semantic-based analysis based on the variable
length context-based feature extraction (VCLFE) scheme that takes advantage
of AST representation [2].
One controversial issue in this area of research is the physical location where
the detection mechanism takes place. One approach is to collect and analyze
HTTP traffic via local proxy and implement the detection algorithm on the
proxy side [18]. Another approach is to implement the detection mechanism
on the client side, such as the work done by V. Sachin et al., who used light-
weight JavaScript instrumentation that enables static and dynamic analysis of
the visited webpage to detect malicious behavior[21]. R. K. Kishor et al. took
an extra step and developed an extension that can be installed on the client
web browser to detect malicious web contents [10]. Similar work was done by C.
Wang et al., who focused on the browser detection mechanism integrated with
HTML5 and Cross Origin resource sharing (CORS) properties [26].
In recent years, JavaScript became a very popular solution for hybrid mobile
applications. This recent adoption of technology in mobile applications poses a
new risk of malicious code injection attacks on mobile devices. J. Mao et al. pro-
posed a method to detect anomalous behaviors in hybrid Android apps as anoma-
lies in function call behaviors [14]. The authors instrumented the JavaScript code
dynamically in the JavaScript engine to intercept function calls of JavaScript in
hybrid apps. They also extracted events from the Android WebView component
to enhance the performance of their proposed detection model [14].
Since the feature engineering step is the core of any machine-learning malware
detection solution, many researchers focused on developing a feature engineering
methodology. H. Adas et al. proposed a method to extract inspection features
from over two million mobile URLs [1]. The authors used a MapReduce/Hadoop
based cloud computing platform to train and implement their classifier and eval-
uate its performance. Although this is a good step towards building a cloud-based
classifier, more experiments need to be conducted to evaluate its efficiency with
respect to real-time detection of malware. Moreover, the classification model
in [1] was trained with features based on the static analysis of the malicious
code, which is not an efficient approach in detecting most fileless malwares.
S. Ndichu et al. developed a neural network model that can be trained to
learn the context information of texts [16]. The main contribution of the work
in [16] is developing a new feature extraction method and using unsupervised
learning algorithms that produce vectors of fixed lengths. These vectors can be
used to train a neural network that classifies the JavaScript code as normal
or malicious [16]. Similar work was done earlier by Y. Wang et al. using deep
learning [27]. Wang et al. used deep features extracted by stacked denoising
autoencoders (SdA) to detect malicious JavaScript codes [27].
Neural networks were not the only machine learning framework used to detect
malicious JavaScript codes. Seshagiri et al. used Support Vector Machine (SVM)
to detect malicious JavaScript codes [23]. Features were extracted using static
analysis of web pages. Although ML is a promising solution, there are many
challenges that faces developers during the implementation of such solutions.
The main challenge is creating a feature vector that can truly characterize the
behaviour of fileless malware. Fileless malwares do not leave clear traces on the
victim’s machine and therefore are very difficult to identify.
Other research directions are considered in the literature. The following are
few examples of different approaches considered by researchers in the last few
years. B. Sayed et al. proposed a model that uses information flow control dy-
namically at run-time to detect malicious JavaScript [22]. Y. Fange et al. used
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) to develop a malicious JavaScript detec-
tion model [8]. V. Shen used a high-level fuzzy Petri net (HLFPN) to detect
JavaScript malware [20]. D. Cosovan used hidden markov models and linear
classifiers to detect JavaScript-based malware [6]. Last but not least, D. Maiorca
et al. used discriminant and adversary-aware API analysis to detect malicious
scripting code[12].
Although the previous work in this research area presented promising results,
there are many challenges that prevent accurate detection of fileless malwares
in real web applications. To highlight the significance of the threat posed by
fileless malwares, this paper presents a practical design and implementation of a
fileless malware as a proof-of-concept (PoC) to demonstrate the threats of fileless
malware in web applications.
3 Benign Features with Malicious Potentials
With the introduction of HTML5, a new generation of modern web applications
become a reality. This is mainly because HTML5 introduced a rich-set of power-
ful APIs and features that can be used by JavaScript. Some of the new features
and APIs in HTML focus on enabling the development of web apps with high
connectivity and performance. Further, HTML5 provides a set of APIs that al-
low web applications written in JavaScript to access information about the host
running the web app and also other peripheral devices connected to the host. For
instance, a web app developed with HTML5 and JavaScript could have access
to the user geolocation, device orientation, mic, and camera.
While these new powerful features were proposed to improve web application
development, we found in our analysis of these features that hackers and malware
authors could misuse them. Many of these benign features have serious malicious
potential. In this section, we will mainly focus on HTML5 features that were
proposed to boost web application performance, scalability, and connectivity.
3.1 WebSockets
WebSocket is a new communication protocol that enables a web-client and a
web-server to establish a two-way (full-duplex) interactive communication chan-
nel over a single TCP connection [17]. It provides bi-directional real-time com-
munication which is an urgent requirement for modern interactive web appli-
cations. With WebSocket, the communication method between the web-client
and the web-server is not limited to pull-communication [19]. Instead, push-
communication and even an interactive communication become possible. For
this reason, WebSocket becomes the dominated technology in developing in-
stant messaging apps, gaming applications, streaming services, or any web app
which requires data exchange between the client and the server in real-time.
WebSocket is currently supported by all major web browsers such as Chrome,
Firefox, Safari, Edge, and IE. Moreover, the WebSocket protocol is supported
by common programming languages such as Java, Python, C#, and others.
This enables the development of desktop, mobile apps, or even microservices
that communicate using WebSocket as a modern and convenient communication
protocol.
It is clear that using WebSocket the connectivity of web apps moves to a new
level of high quality and reliability. However, WebSocket is considered by web
security researchers a security risk [?]. WebSocket enables a new attack vector
for malicious actors. Common web attacks such as cross-site scripting (XSS) and
man in the middle (MitM) are possible over WebSockets. WebSocket by design
does not obey the same-origin policy; this means the web browser will allow a
WebSocket script to connect to different web pages even if they do not share
the same origin (same URI scheme, host and port number). Again WebSocket
by design is not bound by cross-origin resource sharing (CORS). This means a
web app running inside the client web browser could request resources that have
a different origin from the web app. This flexibility could be easily abused by
malicious actors as we will demonstrate in the next section.
3.2 WebWorkers
Originally JavaScript is a single-threaded language which means in any web app
there is only a single line of code or statement that can be executed at any
given time. As a result, JavaScript cannot perform multiple tasks simultane-
ously. WebWorker is a new JavaScript feature that was introduced with HTML5
to improve the performance of the JavaScript application [3]. WebWorker en-
ables JavaScript code to run in a background thread separate from the main
execution thread of a web app. In other words WebWorker allows web applica-
tions to execute tasks in the background without impacting the user interface as
it works completely separate from the UI thread. For this reason, WebWorkers
are typically used to run long and expensive operations without blocking the UI.
For instance, the code in Listing 1.1 initialize a new web worker object and runs
the code in worker.js asynchronously in a new thread.
if (typeof(worker) == "undefined") {
worker = new Worker("worker.js");
}
Listing 1.1. WebWorker Initialization Example
WebWorker should be used to do computationally intensive tasks to avoid
blocking the UI or any other code executed in the main thread. If a computa-
tionally intensive task executes in the main JavaScript thread, the web app will
freeze and become unresponsive to the user. WebWorker is currently supported
by all major web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Safari, Edge, and IE.
As we can see WebWorker is an essential feature for developing a modern
and responsive web application. However, the devil is in the details. While Web-
Worker seems like a harmless feature, it opens the door for several malicious sce-
narios and security issues. For example, it allows DOM-based cross-site scripting
(XSS) [24]. CORS does not bind it, and hence a web worker could share and
access resources from different origins. But in our opinion, the most critical secu-
rity issue with WebWorker is its ability to insert silent running JavaScript code.
This could enable a malicious payload to run in a background thread created by
malicious or compromised web apps. One possible example is using WebWorker
with a malicious web app to preform cryptocurrency mining without the users’
consent. The WebWorker will terminate if the worker completed the execution
of the script or if the user closes the web browser or the web app that created
the web worker object.
3.3 Service Workers
ServiceWorker is another new appealing JavaScript feature. We could consider
ServiceWorker as a special type of WebWoker. ServiceWorker allows running
JavaScript code in a separate background thread. This is very similar to Web-
Worker but unlike WebWorker, the lifetime of the ServiceWorker is not tied to
a specific webpage or even the web browser [7]. This means even if the user
navigates away from the web app that created the ServiceWorker or terminated
the web browser, the ServiceWorker will continue to run in the background.
The ServiceWorker will normally terminate when it’s complete (e.g., execute all
the computation tasks) or received a termination signal from the web server, or
terminate abnormally as a result of a crash, system reboot or shutdown.
ServiceWorker was introduced to enable rich offline experience to the users
and improve the performance of modern web apps. The code in Listing 1.2
shows an example that creates a ServiceWorker from the file sw demo.js. Ser-
viceWorkers share the same security issues and risks that exist in WebWorkers
but the lifetime of the security risks are persistent.
window.addEventListener(’load’, () => {
navigator.serviceWorker.register(’/sw_demo.js’)
.then(( registration) => {
// ServiceWorker registered successfully
}, (err) => {
// ServiceWorker registration failed
});
});
Listing 1.2. ServiceWorker Registration Example
4 JavaScript Fileless Malware
In this section, we explain how the benign JavaScript features we introduced in
section 3 could be used to implement a fileless JavaScript malware. To demon-
strate this threat, we design and implement JSLess as a PoC fileless malware.
We design JSLess as a fileless polymorphic malware, with a dynamic malicious
payload, that applies both timing and event-based evasion.
4.1 Infection Scenarios
In our investigation, we define two main infection scenarios. The first scenario
is when the victim (web user) visits a malicious web server or application as
illustrated in Figure 2. In this case, the malicious web server will not show
any malicious behaviors until a specific event triggers the malicious behavior.
In our demo, the attack posts specific text messages on a common chat room.
The message act as an activation command to the malware. When the message
is received the malware is injected dynamically into the victim’s browser and
starts running as part of the script belonging to the public chat room.
The second infection scenario is when the malware compromise a legitimate
web application or server to infect the web browsers of the users who are currently
visiting the compromised website as illustrated in Figure 3. In this case, both the
website and the website visitors are victims of the malware attack. The malware
will open a connection with the malicious server (e.g., C&C server) that hosts
the malware to download the malicious payload or receive a command from the
malware authors to execute on the victim browser.
Note that in both scenarios the malicious code infection/injection happens
on the client side, not the server side.
4.2 Operational Scenario
JSLess delivered to the victim web browser through a WebSocket connection.
When the victim visits a malicious web server, the WebSocket connection will
be part of the web app on the malicious server. However, if the malware authors
prefer to deliver JSLess by compromising a legitimate web app/server to increase
in the infection rate, then the WebSocket delivery code could be added into a
third-party JavaScript library (e.g. JQuery). Almost all modern web application
relies on integrating third-party JavaScript files. The WebSocket delivery code is
relatively (see the code in Listing 1.3) and could easily be hidden in a malicious
third-party script library that is disguised as legitimate. Alternatively, the code
could be inserted via an HTML injection attack on a vulnerable site that does
not correctly sanitize the user input.
MalWS = new WebSocket(’{{ WSSurl }}/ KeyCookieLog.js’);
MalWS.onmessage = function(e) {
sc = document.createElement(’script ’);
sc.type = ’text/javascript ’;
sc.id = ’MalSocket ’;
sc.appendChild(document.createTextNode(e.data));
B = document.getElementsByTagName("body");
B[0]. appendChild(sc);
};
Listing 1.3. malicious payload delivered with websocket
The WebSocket API is used to deliver the malware source code in JavaScript
to the victim browser. Once the connection is opened, it downloads the JavaScript
code and uses it to create a new script element which is appended as a child to
the HTML file’s body element. This causes the downloaded script to be executed
by the client’s web browser.
Delivering the malware payload over WebSocket and dynamically inject it
into the client’s web browser provide several advantages to malware authors. The
fact that the malware code is only observable when the web browser is executing
the code and mainly as a result of a trigger event provides one important fileless
behavior for the malware. The malicious code is never written to the victim’s file
system. Using WebSocket to deliver the malware payload does not raise any red
flags by anti-malware systems since it is a popular and common benign feature.
Using benign APIs is another essential characteristic of fileless malware.
The fact that JSLess can send any malicious payload for many attack vectors
and inject arbitrary JavaScript code with the option to obfuscate the injected
malicious code enables the design of polymorphic malware. All of these attributes
make JSLess a powerful malware threat that can easily evade detection by anti-
malware systems. For instance, a pure JavaScript logger could be quickly injected
in the user’s browser to captures user’s keystroke events and send them to the
malware C&C server over WebSocket. Note that benign and native JavaScript
keystroke capturing APIs are used which again will not raise any red flags. Figure
Fig. 1. Obfuscated JavaScript code injected in the body of web page which opens a
secure WebSocket connection with Remote C&C Server to send the user’s keystrokes
information to attacker
1 shows an exmaple of an injected JavaScript key logger that captures keystroke
events and send it to the malware C&C server over WebSockect.
To utilize the victim system’s computation power or run the malicious scripts
in a separate thread from the main UI thread, JSless takes advantage of Web-
Workers. This allows JSless to run malicious activities that are computationally
intensive, such as cryptocurrency mining. The WebWorker script is downloaded
from the C&C server. The JavaScript code in Listing 1.4 shows how the mali-
cious WebWorker code could be obtained as a blob object and initiated on the
victim’s browser. In conjunction with the importScripts and createObjectURL
functions, we were able to load a script from a different domain hosted on the
different server and executed it in the background of the benign web app.
blob = new Blob(["self.importScripts (’{{ HTTPSurl }}/ foo.js ’);"
],
{type: ’application/Javascript ’});
w = new Worker(URL.createObjectURL(blob));
Listing 1.4. Breaking Same-origin Policy with ImportScripts()
Until this point one limitation of JSless malware-framework is that fact that
the malware will terminate as soon as the user closes his web browser or navigates
away from the compromised/malicious web server. This limitation is not specific
to JSless, it is the common behaviors of any fileless malware. In fact, many
malware authors sacrifice the persistence of their malware infection by using
fileless malware to avoid detection and bypass anti-malware systems. However,
that does not mean fileless malware authors are not trying to come up with new
methods and techniques to make their fileless malware persistent. In our investi-
gation to provide persistence for JSless even if the user navigates away from the
compromised/malicious web page or closes the web browser, we took advantage
of the ServiceWorker API to implement a malware persistence technique with
minimal footprint.
To achieve malware persistence, we used the WebSocket API to download a
script from the malicious server. After downloading the ServiceWorker registra-
tion code from the malicious server as shown in Listing 1.1, it registers a sync
event as shown in Listing 1.5, cause the downloaded code to execute and stay
alive even if the user has navigated away from the original page or closed the
web browser. The malicious code will continue to run and terminate normally
when it is completed or abnormally as result of exception, crash or if the user
restarts his machine. Note that when we use ServiceWorker, a file is created and
temporarily stored on the client machine while the ServiceWorker is running.
This is the only case where JSless will place a file on the victim machine, and it
is only needed for malware persistence.
self.addEventListener(’sync’, function (event) {
if (event.tag === ’mal -service -worker ’) {
event.waitUntil(malServiceWorker ()
.then(( response) => {
// Service Worker task is done
}));
}
});
function malServiceWorker () {
// Malicious activity can be performed here
}
Listing 1.5. ServiceWorker Implementation for malicious purpose
In our proof-of-concept implementation for the malware persistence with Ser-
viceWorker, we implemented a MapReduce system. In this malicious MapRe-
duce system, all the current infected web browsers receive the map function and
a chunk of the data via WebSocket. The map function executes as a Service-
Worker and operates over the data chunks sent by the malicious server. When
the ServiceWorker finishes executing the map function, it returns the result to
the malicious server via WebSocket. When the malicious server receives the re-
sults from the ServiceWorker, it performs the reduce phase and returns the final
result to the malware author.
4.3 Attack Vectors
The ability to inject and execute arbitrary JavaScript code allows JSless to
support a wide variety of malicious attacks. Here are the most common attacks
that JSless could execute:
Data Stealing On infection JSless can easily collect keystrokes, cookie and
web storage data, as demonstrated in our PoC. Also, it could control multimedia
devices and capture data from a connected mic or webcam using native browser
WebRTC APIs.
DDoS JSless malicious C&C server could orchestrate all the currently infected
web browsers to connect to a specific URL or web server to perform a DDoS
attack. In this case, JSless constructs a botnet of infected browsers to execute
the DDoS attack.
Resource Consumption Attack In this case, JSless could use the infected
users’ browser to run computationally intensive tasks such as cryptocurrency
mining, password cracking, etc. The MapReduce system we implement as part
of JSless is an example of managing and running computationally intensive tasks.
Also, beside the above attacks which we have implemented in our JSless it is
possible to perform other attacks like Click Fraud, RAT-in-the-Browser (RitB)
Attacks, and many other web-based attacks.
5 Experiment & Evaluation
In order to assess the identified JavaScript/HTML5 vulnerabilities and threats,
we developed JSless as a proof-of-concept fileless malware that is completely
written in JavaScript. We used the second injection scenario to test our fileless
malware implementation. For this purpose, we also implemented a web app that
JSless will compromise to infect the web browser of any user using the web app.
The web app is a shared chat board that allows users to register, post and receive
messages to/from a shared chat board. The web app and the JSless C&C server
are implemented in JavaScript using MEAN stack (MongoDB, ExpressJS, Angu-
larJS, and Node.js). The source code for the fileless malware and the target web
app is available on our GitHub/bitbucket repository for interested researchers
and security analysts.
For the actual test, we deployed the target web app and the JSless C&C
server on Amazon Web Services (AWS). We used two AWS instances with two
different domains, one to host the target web app and the second to host JSLess
C&C server. We mainly tested two attack vectors, the data stealing attack and
the resource consumption attack.
5.1 JS Malware Detection Tools
To our surprise, few anti-malware systems try to detect JavaScript malware. We
identified seven tools that we considered promising based on the techniques and
the technology they use for detection. Most of the tools apply both static and
dynamic analysis. Some of those tools are commercial, but they provide a free
trial period that includes all the commercial feature for a limited time. Table 1
shows the list of tools we used in our study.
None of the tools were able to detect JSless malicious behaviors.
Tool Name Detection Technique License Website Detect JSLess
ReScan.pro static & dynamic commercial https://rescan.pro/ NO
VirusTotal static & dynamic free & commerical https://www.virustotal.com/ NO
SUCURI static commercial https://sucuri.net/ NO
SiteGuarding static commercial https://www.siteguarding.com/ NO
Web Inspector static & dynamic free https://app.webinspector.com/ NO
Quttera static & dynamic free & commercial https://quttera.com/ NO
AI-Bolit static & dynamic free & commercial https://revisium.com/aibo/ NO
Table 1. JavaScript and Web App Malware Detection Tools
5.2 Detection & Mitigation
By reviewing the results from the detection tools and how those tools work, it is
obvious that detecting JSLess is not possible. The use of WebSocket to inject and
run obfuscated malicious code, make it almost impossible to any static analysis
tool to detect JSLess, since the malicious payload does not exist at the time
of static analysis. The use of benign JavaScript/HTML5 APIs and features, in
addition to the dynamic injection behaviors also make it very difficult for the
current dynamic analysis tools to detect JSLess. Blocking or preventing new
JavaScript/HTML5 APIs is not the solution and it is not an option. In our
opinion, a dynamic analysis technique that implements continuous monitoring
and context-aware is the only approach that we think could detect or mitigate
fileless malware similar to JSLess.
5.3 Tools Analysis Results
ReScan.Pro It is a cloud-based web application scanner which takes URL
of the website and generates a scan report after filtering the website for web-
based malware and other web security issues. It explores the website URLs and
checks for infections, suspicious contents, obfuscated malware injections, hidden
redirects and other web security threats present. In-depth and comprehensive
analysis of ReScan.Pro based on three main features.
1. Static Page Scanning: combination generic signature detection technique and
heuristic detection. It uses signature and pattern-based analysis to identify
malicious code snippets and malware injections. It also looks for malicious
and blacklisted URLs in a proprietary database.
2. Behavioral Analysis: imitates the website user’s behavior to evaluate the
intended action of implemented functionality.
3. Dynamic Page Analysis: performs dynamic web page loading analysis which
includes deobfuscation techniques to decode the encoded JavaScript in order
to identify the runtime code injects and it also checks for malware in external
JavaScript files.
We ran the experiment with the ReScan.Pro to test if it will detect the
malicious activities of JSless malware. It generated a well defined report after
analyzing the website with its static and dynamic features. The produced re-
sult shows that the website is clean and no malicious activity has been found.
ReScan.Pro could not detect our JavaScript fileless malware.
Web Inspector This tool runs a website security scan and provides a malware
report which has more information than most other tools. Its security scanner
is bit different from others because it performs both malware and vulnerabil-
ities scans together. For scanning a website, it just requires a user to provide
the website URL and click on the Start the Scan button. It starts scanning the
website and generates the report within minutes. This tool provides five different
detection technologies such as (1) Honeypot Engine, (2) Antivirus Detection, (3)
BlackList Checking, (4) SSL Checking, and (5) Analyst Research. The Honeypot
Engine has special algorithms for Exploit Packs and multi-redirect malware de-
tection and it gives full web content scan using a real browser clone with popular
plugins. Web inspector shows a threat report which includes Blacklists, Phishing,
Malware Downloads, Suspicious code, Heuristic Viruses, Suspicious connections,
and worms.
As described above, Web Inspector provides a report on full web content
scanning by applying various techniques to detect malware. However, we noticed
that our JavaScript fileless malware was able to successfully deceive this malware
detection tool as well.
Sucuri Sucuri is yet another tool that offers a website monitoring solution to
evaluate any website’s security with a free online scanner. This scanning tool
searches for various indicators of compromise, which includes malware, drive-by
downloads, defacement, hidden redirects, conditional malware, etc. To match
more signatures and generate fewer false positives, it uses static techniques with
intelligent signatures which are based on code anomalies and heuristic detection.
Server side monitoring is another service provided by them which can be hosted
on the compromised server to look for backdoors, phishing attack vulnerabilities,
and other security issues by scanning the files present on the server. Moreover,
Sucuri provides a scanning API as a paid feature to scan any site and get a result
similar to what is provided on its internal malware scanners.
Testing with Sucuri online scanner, we see it displays that there is ”No Mal-
ware Found” as well as a seek bar indicating a medium security risk. However,
this is due to Insecure SSL certificates, not from the detection of our fileless
malware.
Quttera Quttera is a popular website scanner that attempts to identify malware
and suspicious activities in web application. Its malware detector contains non-
signature based technology which attempts to uncover traffic re-directs, generic
malware, and security weakness exploits. It can be accessed from any computer
or mobile device through a web browser. It also provides real-time detection of
shell-codes, obfuscated JavaScript, malicious iframes, traffic re-direct and other
online threats.
VirusTotal VirusTotal is a free malware inspection tool which offers a number
of services to scan websites and files leveraging a large set of antivirus engines
and website scanners. This aggregation of different tools covers wide variety
of techniques, such as heuristic, signature based analysis, domain blacklisting
services, etc. A detailed report is provided after completing the scan which not
only indicates the malicious content present in a file or website but also exhibits
the detection label by each engine.
We scan our compromised web app with VirusTools using 66 different mal-
ware detection engine, and none of those 66 engines was able to detect that the
web app is compromised.
AI-BOLIT is an antivirus malware scanner for websites and hosting. It uses
heuristic analysis and other patented AI algorithms to find malware from any
kind of scripts and templates. We used it to scan our JSLess malware scripts.
However, it failed to detect JSLess and it generated false positive when it consider
some of the core modules of NodeJS as malicious JavaScripts.
6 Conclusion & Future Work
In this paper, we confirmed several threat-vectors that exist in new JavaScript
and HTML5. We demonstrate how an attacker could abuse benign features
and APIs in JavaScript and HTML5 to implement fileless malware with ad-
vanced evasion capabilities. We showed a practical implementation of a fileless
JavaScript malware that to our knowledge the first of its kind. The proof-of-
concept implementation of the proposed JS fileless malware successfully bypasses
several well-known anti-malware systems that are designed to detect JavaScript
and web malware. In addition, third-party malware analysts team confirmed our
finding and prove that the proposed malware bypasses automated malware de-
tection systems. From this particular study, we conclude that the current static
and dynamic analysis techniques are limited if not useless against fileless mal-
ware attacks. Moreover, fileless malware attacks are not limited to PowerShell
and Windows environment. In our opinion, any computing environment that
enables running and executing arbitrary code could are vulnerable to fileless
attacks.
Our future work could be summarized in three different directions. First, we
will continue extending the malicious behaviors of JSLess and investigate the
possibility of more advanced attacks using other new benign features and APIs
from JavaScript and HTML5. Second, we will design a new detection technique
to detect advanced JS malware and mainly fileless JS malware like the proposed
JSLess. We plan to implement behaviors and dynamic analysis approach that
continually monitor and analysis Javascript and Browser activities. Finally, our
third research direction will focus on investigating fileless malware threat in
unconventional computing environments, such as the Internet of Things, in-
memory computing environments (e.g., Redis, Hazelcast, Spark, etc.). We hope
our research will help to raise awareness of the emerging unconventional malware
threats.
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